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Recently, there is an emerging trend of addressing “energy eﬃciency” aspect of wireless
communications. It has been shown that cooperating users relay each other’s information to
improve data rates. The energy is limited in the wireless cellular network, but the mobile
users refuse to relay. This paper presents an approach that encourages user cooperation in
order to improve the energy eﬃciency. The game theory is an eﬃcient method to solve such
conflicts. We present a cellular framework in which two mobile users, who desire to communicate
with a common base station, may cooperate via decode-and-forward relaying. In the case of
imperfect information assumption, cooperative Nash dynamic game is used between the two
users’ cooperation to tackle the decision making problems: whether to cooperate and how to
cooperate in wireless networks. The scheme based on “cooperative game theory” can achieve
general pareto-optimal performance for cooperative games, and thus, maximize the entire system
payoﬀ while maintaining fairness.
1. Introduction
The continuously growing demand for ubiquitous wireless access leads to the rapid
development of the wireless cellular networks during the last decade. Such tremendous
growth in wireless industry has made it become one of the leading sources of the world
energy consumption, and it is expected to grow dramatically in the future. The electricity
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bill has become a significant portion of the operational expenditure of operators 1. Rapidly
rising energy costs and increasingly rigid environmental standards have led to an emerging
trend of addressing “energy eﬃciency” aspect of wireless communication technologies.
In a typical wireless cellular network, user cooperation can increase the users’ data
rates 2–5. It has been shown that cooperating users relay each other’s information to
improve the data rates 6. One user’s rate increases only when another user expends relay
energy on its behalf. The energy is limited in the wireless cellular network but mobile users
refuse to relay, which renders user cooperation ostensibly unappealing. But it is very
important that user cooperation is advantageous from the perspective of energy eﬃciency.
We need an approach that encourages user cooperation in order to improve their energy
eﬃciency. The game theory is an eﬃcient method to solve such conflicting problems 7. It
was introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern 8. In 9, a cooperative Nash game
is used between the two users’ cooperation to improve the bits-per-energy eﬃciency, but
it assumed global channel state information, which is often diﬃcult to obtain in practice.
Each player is given a utility function the reward or penalty it receives of its own strategy
and the strategies are played by all the other players or a subset of them. In the general
approach, the game and the strategies are discrete, and therefore, matrices with strategies
and payoﬀs the rewards or penaltiesmay be assembled. The players should make decision
when each player has not a small number of strategies. To tackle the decision-making
problems on whether to cooperate and how to cooperate in wireless networks, a diﬀerential
game was introduced by Isaacs 10. Many research works based on game theory have
been published 11. Cooperative games hold out the promise of socially optimal and
group eﬃcient solutions to problems involving strategic actions. Formulation of the optimal
player’s behavior is a fundamental element in this theory. The schemes based on “cooperative
game theory” can achieve the general pareto-optimal performance for cooperative games
and, thus, maximize the entire system payoﬀ while maintaining fairness 12.
Generally, when solving a game theoretically, one also assumes that one agent or
player has access to the states of the other players involved in the game at all times as well
as their cost functions 13, 14. This is called the perfect information assumption. In fact,
it is impossible to realize that each player knows the decision making of all the others. Little
attention has been paid to how a player may learn to play the game. So in this paper, we adopt
dynamic game, which investigates how decision making takes place over time 15. Robust
Nash Equilibria is derived based on the Robust Maximum Principle 16. This extension of
the traditionalMaximun Principle 17, allows us to deal with systems that can be interpreted,
to be presented as a family of ordinary diﬀerential equations, each of which corresponds to a
diﬀerent scenario or possible dynamics. But there are always uncertainties in the game. The
main drawback of this last approach ignores uncertainties. Therefore, in the situation when
there are any unmeasured uncertainties, another design concept must be developed.
Generally, imperfect channel state information has significant impacts on the
performance of not only cellular networks, but also wireless networks. Many works also
assume global channel state information, which is often diﬃcult to obtain in practice.
Moreover, since the channel state information in cellular networks is often limited, we
introduce the possibility of channel prediction. We study an eﬃcient solution, which is AR-
model-based predictionmethod, to take the prediction for the channel information states. AR-
model-based prediction method has good suitability and robustness that utilizes fast tracking
of channel coeﬃcients, which demonstrates for realistic channel conditions.
Mathematical Problems in Engineering 3
User 1 User 1User 2
BS BS
User 2
h u
s1 h u
s1h
us2
h
us2
hu12 hu12
Figure 1: Transmission schedule. During odd time blocks, user 1 acts as source and user 2 acts as relay, and
vice versa for even time blocks.
2. System Models
2.1. Transmission Model
In cellular networks, we consider that two mobile users communicate with a common base-
station BS. We assume a simple uplink scenario in Figure 1. User 1 transmits its data to the
BS during the odd time blocks, while user 2 transmits its data during the even time blocks.
The idle user can choose to act as a relay for the active user in order to help to increase the
active users’ rate. The received signals at the relay and destination then 9
y1  hu21kx2 	 ξ1k even k,
y2  hu12kx1 	 ξ2k odd k,
y3  hus1kx1 	 hus2kx2 	 ξ3k,
2.1
where x1, x2 are transmission or relay symbols, and ξ is additive white Gaussian noise.
2.2. Channel Prediction Model
We consider a simple uplink transmission scenario from users to the BS in the cellular
networks, as depicted in Figure 1. We assume that the BSs map a set of messages onto a
set of sequences, which are precoded and transmitted symbol-wise over the channel. The
transmission in each single channel access at sample time slot k can be stated as
yk  Hkxk 	 zk, 2.2
where yk is the received signals, Hk denotes the time-varying channel coﬃcient, xk is
the symbols connected to the messages to be transmitted in channel access k, and zk is the
additive noise at the receiver side, also assumed to be zero-mean Gaussian.
In the AR-model-based algorithm, the prediction of the channel state in time slot k, the
value of channel stateHk is given by 18
̂Hk 
J
∑
j1
djkH
(
k − j) 	 ek, 2.3
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where J is the AR-model order, and Hk − 1 · · ·Hk − j · · ·Hk − J are J previous
channel samples, and ek is a complex white Gaussian noise signal. The AR-model-based
prediction methods are also often referred to as linear predictors LPs. The knowledge of
the identifying is needed for the computation of the AR coeﬃcients djk in 2.3. Because
the channel coeﬃcients are unknown and slowly time-variant in practice, it has to be
estimated from noise-corrupted channel observations. Eﬃcient adaptive filtering techniques,
such as recursive least squares estimate RLSE, were used to track the changes of predictor
coeﬃcients djk in 2.3.
The prediction error, which is defined as the diﬀerence between the predicted value
̂Hk and the actual value Hk, is employed as a performance measure 19–21. The
prediction error can be normalized with the respect to the root mean squared value RMS
of the considered fading process 22. The prediction error analysis of M consecutive
predictions can be done by using the variance defined as follows:
γ2k 
1
M
M−1
∑
m0
(
Hk −m − ̂Hk −m
)2
. 2.4
In this paper, we use RLSE due to its superior performance in accommodating time-
varying system conditions, which results in an eﬃcient method for time-varying radio
channels 23.
2.3. Bits-per-Energy Efficiency
One common method to measure energy eﬃciency is to use bits per Joule 24. Strict
maximization of energy eﬃciency, then, is not typically useful in practice when users have
target rates to meet or delay constraints to satisfy 9. However, the channel prediction in
Section 3 is used to sidestep this obstacle. The total energy expenditure is proportional to
the sum of the power allocations in the previous time blocks. So, the total bits-per-energy
eﬃciency for each user is proportional to 9
ei
(
pr1, pr2
)

Eh
[
ri
(
prjh
)]
1 	 Eh
[
prih
] , 2.5
for i / j, where pr1, pr2 are the power allocated by user1 and user2 while acting as the relay.
ri· is the achievable rate, whose expression follows 9
rik  min
{
max
{
I
(
xi;xj | xj
)
, Ixi;x3
}
, I
(
xi, xj ;y3
)}
, 2.6
where xi, yi are jointly Gaussian, and the mutual information terms depend on the channel
gains and the source and relay powers at time slot k.
3. Theoretic Formulation of Discrete Dynamic Game
A game consists of three objects: a set of players, a set of strategies which those players can
enact, and a set of cost functions denoting the payoﬀ each player derives from the strategies
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enacted 9. We assume our scenario as a game in which each mobile user is a player whose
strategies are the relay power allocations pri and whose cost functions are the bits-per-energy
eﬃciencies eipri.
3.1. Noncooperative Games
In order to compare the energy eﬃciency of noncooperative and cooperative users, the energy
eﬃciency expression of noncooperative users is given. The classic solution concept for a
noncooperative game is the Nash equilibrium NE. The payoﬀ of every noncooperative user
is 9
eNEi  Eh
[
log2
(
1 	 |hi3|2
)]
, 3.1
where E· is the expectation.
The noncooperative game is a strategy that the selfish users simply select their
strategies and never interact again. They improve their payoﬀ by lowing their relay power.
While in fact, users can obtain higher payoﬀ by cooperation.
3.2. Nash Equilibrium Dynamic Game
Recently, the game theory of user cooperation has been studied in the literature. However
neither of these works considers the energy eﬃciency. In 9, the paper studies energy
eﬃciency of user cooperation, but it ignores the process of decision making. The results of
these works assume perfect situation in which each player knows the decision making of all
the others. In fact, it is impossible to implement.
In this paper we consider the linear discrete-time dynamic game model with
uncertainties:
xk 	 1  Axk 	 buk 	Dgx, k, 3.2
whereA, B are the known game constant matrices, xk is the state vector of the game, uk is
the control strategies of each user,D is the constant matrix, and gx, k is the unknown noises
or disturbances part. Each vector belongs to an appropriate dimensional Euclidean space.
If the game under study is as it is for this paper between only two players, the system
dynamics 3.2may be written as
xik 	 1  Axik 	 buik 	Dgix, k, 3.3
where i  1, 2 denotes the two users.
With this linear discrete-time system, we associate a quadratic performance index
Ju1k, u2k 
K
∑
k1
{
|xik 	 1|2Qk	1 	 |uik|2
}
 ‖xi‖2Q 	 ‖ui‖2,
3.4
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where Qk 	 1 ≥ 0, | · |Q denotes an appropriate Euclidean semi- norm weighted by a
nonnegative definite matrix Q, ‖ · ‖ denotes a corresponding l2 norm.
Then we give the Nash Equilibrium strategies of the two users. The payoﬀ, now
represented as Lu1k, u2k, is given in the form
Lu1k, u2k  Ju1k, u2k 	 |xi|2Q. 3.5
In this case it is also assumed that the users who use strategy u1k, u2k want to
maximize the payoﬀ L·. Therefore, the objective of the game is to find a saddle-point
solution u∗1k, u
∗
2k to satisfy the Nash-equilibrium condition
L
(
u∗1k, u2k
) ≤ L(u∗1k, u∗2k
) ≤ L(u1k, u∗2k
)
, 3.6
u∗1k, u
∗
2k is known as a feedback saddle-point solution, then u
∗
1k, u
∗
2k is characterized
as the point on the Pareto boundary that satisfies 3.6, symmetry between players, and
independence to irrelevant alternatives. The control strategies of the users in a cooperative
game are their relay power allocations and the cost functions are their bits-per-energy
eﬃciencies.
4. Simulation Results and Discussions
In this section, we use computer simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme and the influence of uncertainties. The results of numerical experiments are shown
to see the payoﬀ of the cooperation users. The energy eﬃciency of every user increases when
the proposed scheme is used. We compare the proposed scheme with the noncooperation
game scheme, which is a single-stage noncooperative game. The solution to a game depends
on the particular game theoretic frame work employed. We consider a simple case that the
selfish players select strategies in order to maximize individual energy eﬃciency in spite of
the payoﬀ of other players. The players never interact again. Then another user cooperation
scheme which does not use dynamic game and assumes perfect channel state information 9
is compared with the proposed scheme.
Figure 2 shows the coeﬃcients in the AR-model-based channel prediction algorithm
of one wireless channel, d1 and d2, which are defined in 2.3. As we can see from
the figure, the AR-model coeﬃcients vary with simulation time due to the time-varying
wireless channel. The recursive least square estimate RLSE algorithm presented in Section 3
can accommodate the time-varying wireless channel conditions to make accurate channel
predictions.
The performance of the channel prediction algorithm can be measured by using the
error variance, which is defined in 2.4. Figure 3 shows the error variance in the AR-model-
based channel prediction algorithm. In Figure 3, we can observe that, when the simulation
time increases, the error variance decreases, meaning that the channel prediction becomes
more accurate. In addition, we can see that the variance drops below 1 quickly in the
simulation, which means that the prediction algorithm is suﬃciently accurate.
Because there is time-varying external disturbance and uncertainties in the cellular
network, the cooperation of users should consider the eﬀect of them for energy eﬃciency. It
is assumed that the external disturbance is given by wdk 	 1  0.95wdk with wd0  1.
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Figure 2: The coeﬃcients in the AR-model-based channel prediction algorithm.
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Figure 3: The error variance in the AR-model-based channel prediction algorithm.
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Figure 4: Time-varying external disturbance.
Figure 4 shows the plot of the time-varying external disturbance. It is also assumed that there
is an unknown uncertainty which is time-varying in the range |vunk| ≤ 1. The time-varying
uncertainty vunk is randomly generated as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 6 depicts the variation bit per Joule eﬃciency of the user cooperation in the
uplink scenario. The result indicates that the cooperation of the users is helpful to increase
the energy eﬃciency.We set the expected interuser gains to set user 2’s expected gainE‖h223‖ 
10 dB and make E‖h213‖dB vary between −5dB and 20dB in order to compare with 9. This
range allows us to see the cooperation performance of the proposed scheme when users’
channel conditions are asymmetric, which gives us a reasonable result. Figure 6 shows that
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Figure 5: Time-varying external disturbance.
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Figure 6: The energy eﬃciency of diﬀerent schemes.
each user’s bit per Joule eﬃciency by using the proposed scheme is the largest, and the 9 is
the second. The bit per Joule eﬃciency of the users without cooperation is the smallest. This
shows it can benefit from the cooperation for selfish users by using the proposed scheme.
5. Conclusion
In wireless cellular networks, it is very important to increase the energy eﬃciency of the radio
access networks to meet the challenges raised by the high demands of traﬃc and energy
consumption. In this paper, we proposed a dynamic game based on the control-theoretical
approach to study the energy eﬃciency issues in cooperative wireless cellular networks with
cellular communications. In addition, we use a predictor in our control-theoretical approach
to supervise the data of imperfect channel state information. Simulation results have been
presented to show the eﬀectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Mutiuser cooperation case is considered in the future work. We also consider
heterogeneous cellular networks with femtocells, which is another promising technique to
increase the indoor network coverage and capacity for the growing demands of cellular
services, and it has been integrated in current and future radio access networks. In addition,
intercell interference will be considered in our control-theoretical framework.
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